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Abstract 
 There is hardly anything more central to our universe than conservation. Many scientific fields and 
disciplines view the law of conservation as one of the most fundamental universal laws. The Darwinian model 
pivots the process of evolution on variability, reproduction, and natural selection.  Conservation plays a marginal 
role in this model and is not really universal, as the model allows exceptions to conservation, i.e.                         
non-conservation, to play an equally important role in evolution. This anomalous role of conservation in the 
Darwinian model raises questions:  What is the reason for this anomaly?  Is conservation really universal, as we 
tend to believe or is it not, as the Darwinian model suggests?  This contribution proposes a new model of 
evolution that focuses on levels of organization, rather than of species, organisms, or populations.  It argues 
that conservation is central to evolution. Not only does this new model restores the universal status of 
conservation but it also makes possible to resolve some outstanding problems and controversies that continue to 
plague the Darwinian model.  The article tries to advance the broad Darwinian project that seeks to explain the 
process of evolution as a product of the spontaneous processes in nature. 
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Introduction 
The Darwinian Project 
 The publication of the book On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life 
by Charles Spencer Darwin in 1859 created an overnight 
sensation [1]. It marked the beginning of what has 
become one of the longest lasting intellectual projects in 
recent history. Its importance has not diminished as 
time has passed; it is as relevant today as it was over 
150 years ago. 
 There is a good reason for this longevity.  
Darwin’s project speaks directly to one of the most 
fundamental issues at the heart of our civilization: who 
we are and what our place is in the universe [2, p. 3].  
Humans are unique in comparison to the rest of nature.  
They are the only species that has consciousness and 
the capacity for rational thought.  What is the source of 
these unique properties?   
 The religious tradition that has dominated our 
civilization for a very long time provided an 
unambiguous answer. The emergence of human race is 
an act of divine will. God has created humans.  Since 
God and divine creation are inaccessible to human 
reason, humans cannot have a rational understanding of 
their origin.  Faith is the only way to grasp the source of 
humanity.  Sanctified by the religious tradition, this view 
of the origin of humanity was for a long time the only 
answer to the question of who we are and what our 
place is in the universe. 
 The rise of secular thought and science has 
dramatically changed the situation. Modern forms of 
knowledge challenged the dominance of religious 
doctrines.  Yet despite many remarkable achievements 
the fundamental questions about our place in the 
universe remained unanswered.  Even the new secular 
thinkers and scientists recognized that the problem may 
very well be in principle irresolvable due to fundamental 
differences in the nature of human thought and physical 
universe.  Rene Descartes argued that reality consisted 
of two types of objects—“res cogitans” and “res 
extensa,” or things that are thought and things that 
have extension. According to Descartes, these two types 
of objects constituted two separate realms that were 
dramatically different in their nature and largely 
incommensurable to each other [3]. Thought, Descartes 
contended, has no extension that is the fundamental 
property of the material world. The conclusion that 
followed from Descartes’ argument was that thought 
and thinking could not in principal emerge from the 
world of nature. 
Although Descartes’ argument made perfect 
logical sense, the conclusion that followed form it 
created a great deal of discomfort among thinkers who 
came after Descartes.  The argument implied that there 
were insurmountable limitations to human thought. The 
dualism proclaimed by Descartes posed a problem for a 
civilization that increasingly embraced the notion that its 
survival depended on rational understanding of reality.  
Darwin’s theory opened the path to solving the problem 
created by Cartesian dualism. 
The true significance of Darwin was not in 
discovering evolution. There were evolutionists before 
Darwin--representatives of the German 
Naturphilosophie, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Herbert 
Spencer, Robert Chambers, and others. They all saw 
nature as a dynamic system in the process of change 
and rejected the atomistic and mechanistic view of life 
world advocated by thinkers of the Enlightenment.  
However, they all believed that the course of the 
evolution from microorganisms to humans followed 
some preconceived plan. They also believed that the 
realization of this plan—its final goal—guided the 
evolution of life; and each stage in this evolution 
brought the plan closer to its realization. 
 The novelty that Darwin brought into 
evolutionary thinking was the idea that evolution had no 
plan and no goal.  He argued that evolution was a result 
of the spontaneous forces and processes of nature and 
nothing else.  There was much that was new and deeply 
disturbing in the Darwinian project that represented an 
attempt to bridge the gap between humanity and the 
rest of nature without a recourse to some preconceived 
plan or goal, either internal or external to nature.  Also, 
the project foreshadowed a displacement of humanity 
from the privileged place in the universe assigned to it 
by the religious tradition—a view that had been widely 
accepted prior to Darwin, and not only among people of 
faith but also among non-believers.  Finally, Darwin’s 
project suggested that randomness, contingency, and 
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chance were fundamental properties of nature and the 
universe—a deeply disturbing idea that only gained 
currency almost one hundred years after Darwin. 
In discussing the Darwinian project, one should 
make a distinction between the project and the theory of 
evolution that Darwin articulated in his book.  Since its 
initial formulation by Darwin, the theory of evolution has 
undergone dramatic changes. It has been enriched by 
new findings and ideas. Its range has dramatically 
expanded far beyond biology. Perhaps the most 
dramatic change occurred in the 1930s and 1940s when 
the theory was reformulated to accommodate theoretical 
perspectives and empirical evidence from genetics, 
paleontology, and systematics. This result was the 
“modern synthesis,” or what we often refer to today as 
the Standard Theory of Evolution (STE) [4, p. 163; also 
cf. 85]. Subsequently, the Darwinian theory has 
extended its reach well beyond biology, which led to the 
emergence of so-called Universal Darwinism that focuses 
on broad similarities between non-organic evolutionary 
processes and the Darwinian model of evolution [5].  
There are several versions of the evolutionary 
theory today. The novel perspectives on evolution 
emphasize the role of epigenetic processes, phenotypes, 
niches and niche creation, genetic drift, developmental 
bias, plasticity, populations and groups rather than 
organisms or even species. They are as different from 
each other as they are from the original Darwinian 
formulation or even STE [2, pp. 6-8]. The new 
developments have even resulted in calls for adopting a 
new standard theory of evolution—the Extended 
Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) [4, 2]. Moreover, the 
extension of the Darwinian model to the process of 
evolution in non-organic spheres has led to a 
proliferation of competing evolutionary perspectives 
[6,7, 8, p. 243]. Alex Mesoudi, for example, contends 
that cultural studies have produced their own version of 
a “coherent evolutionary science of culture that is just as 
rigorous as evolutionary biology" [6, p. viii].  
Despite their differences, however, all these 
versions share some basic features with Darwin’s 
original formulation. As Kevin Laland has noted, “[t]he 
standard evolutionary theory (SET) largely retains the 
same assumptions as the original modern synthesis, 
which continues to channel how people think about 
evolution” [4, p. 162]. These basic features constitute 
what we may call the Darwinian model of the 
evolutionary process. Although originating in biology, the 
model has a wider application to all areas that 
experience evolutionary change. In his book on cultural 
evolution Alex Mesoudi, for example, notes that there is 
“a growing body of scientific research that is based on 
the fundamental premise that cultural change—by which 
I mean changes in socially transmitted beliefs, 
knowledge, technology, languages, social institutions, 
and so on—shares the very same principles that Darwin 
applied to biological change in The Origin a century and 
a half ago” [6, p. viii]. 
The Darwinian model includes three 
fundamental components:  variation, replication, and 
natural selection [4, p. 162]. According to this model, 
initial variations are absolutely essential for the 
evolutionary process to take place. Without them the 
process simply cannot work. These variations are 
entirely haphazard—a product of spontaneous natural 
processes.  They could be a result of flawed replication, 
random spontaneous mutations or mutations due to 
some entirely accidental external factors that affect 
genetic information.  Some of these variations offer 
advantage, others less so or can even be 
disadvantageous and harmful to the organism. 
Another important component of the Darwinian 
model is the mechanism that is capable of replicating 
these variations.  Finally, there is the component that is 
most closely associated with Darwin’s name and that he 
did a lot to popularize. It is the process of natural 
selection, or what Darwin called the “struggle for 
survival.” This process weeds out those variations that 
offer no advantages or are even disadvantageous.  
These variations become extinct while variations that 
offer advantages survive.  Such are the basic features of 
the Darwinian model that have not only survived to this 
day but dominate evolutionary studies in general, and 
not just in biology. 
The Darwinian project has had an enormous 
impact on our civilization. Its influence has extended far 
beyond the confines of biology. Darwin popularized the 
idea of evolution and today evolutionary thinking has 
become a norm in many fields of knowledge and 
disciplines. Besides biology, the Darwinian model of 
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evolution has had a profound effect on cosmology, 
psychology, social sciences, linguistics, and many other 
fields.  Jiri Tanaka provides a good overview of the 
influence of the Darwinian model on many disciplines 
outside biology [9]. Due in large extent to the Darwinian 
project, we see evolution as characteristic of reality as a 
whole, not just nature and life; we have come to view 
reality in evolutionary terms.  Indeed, we think of 
evolution as a truly universal process--one that is 
integral to our universe.  We see constant evolutionary 
change as the essential condition without which the 
continued existence of our universe would be 
impossible. 
Contradictions and Controversies in the Darwinian Model 
of Evolution 
 Despite the proliferation of new perspectives 
and approaches, there are hardly any rivals that 
challenge the domination of the Darwinian model, even 
though this model is not unproblematic. There are 
several important aspects of the Darwinian model that 
give rise to controversies and problems. This section will 
address some of the main ones that still remain 
unresolved.  
The Conservation Anomaly 
The connection we often make between 
evolution and the continued survival or our universe 
does not come as a surprise. After all, like evolution, 
conservation is also ubiquitous; we find it at all levels of 
organization in our universe. Conservation has its roots 
in the very unique nature of the universe. The universe 
is all there is.  For all we know, it is a closed system.  
Nothing can come into it from outside because there is 
no outside; nothing can disappear from it because there 
is nowhere to disappear. 
In its most basic formulation, the law of 
conservation states that the total energy of an isolated 
system remains constant.  Energy can neither be 
created nor destroyed; it can only change its form. In 
classical physics conservation of energy is distinct from 
conservation of mass.  Einstein’s famous equation that 
relates mass to energy E = mc2 has removed this 
distinction. Conservation also covers charge, spin, as 
well as linear and angular momentum, which pretty 
much extends conservation to all measurable physical 
quantities. 
As one can see, there are many reasons to 
consider conservation universal. It originates in the 
unique nature of our universe—the fact that our 
universe is a closed system.  It also manifests itself at all 
levels of organization of our universe—from physical to 
chemical, biological, etc. Examples of conservation 
abound. Exploding a stick of dynamite converts chemical 
energy into kinetic one; and the conversion of the 
energy of falling water into electricity is another good 
example of conservation in action. Conservation is 
ubiquitous.  That is what makes conservation universal. 
Like conservation, evolution is also universal and 
can be observed at all levels of organization in the 
universe.  The fact that conservation and evolution are 
both universal suggests that the two must be connected.  
The Darwinian model also relates evolution to 
conservation.  After all, biological evolution is about 
survival, and survival is a form of conservation. 
As has already been mentioned, Darwin’s 
innovation is not the idea of evolution, but rather the 
idea that evolution does not follow some prescriptive 
design. There are no supreme makers, no preconceived 
plans, and no final goals in the Darwinian model.  
Evolution is a product of spontaneous forces and 
processes that exist in nature. These forces and 
processes are blind.  As such, they care nothing about 
which organism survives and which becomes extinct.  
They make no choices and have no preferences. 
Darwin and his followers are very clear that 
“natural selection” is really a misnomer, a convenient 
phrase they use to explain what is happening in the 
course of evolution [10, 11, 12, 13]. Although 
contemporary practices of artificial selection influenced 
Darwin, there is nothing that resembles artificial 
selection in his theory. There is no actual selection 
involved, no selectionists who are in a position to select 
anything.  The fact that one organism survives while 
another becomes extinct is merely a result of the 
“struggle for life” under conditions of limited               
resources-the process that eliminates those organisms 
that are unfit or poorly fit into the environment, leaving 
those that fit to live on.  
At first glance the Darwinian model appears to 
be invincible and indisputable in its logic. On close 
analysis, however, it reveals a profound contradiction.  
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Both evolution and conservation are universal, which 
suggests that they are equals.  Universality allows no 
exceptions.  Allowing no exceptions is the very meaning 
of the word “universal.” Since both evolution and 
conservation are universal, they should allow no 
exceptions. Yet, in the Darwinian model some organisms 
survive, while others become extinct, which can only 
mean that conservation allows exceptions; and if that is 
so, then conservation is not universal.  In other words, 
the Darwinian model does not treat conservation and 
evolution as equals.  It reduces the role of conservation 
to that of an extra—a mere by-product of evolution. 
The Darwinian model makes evolution appear as 
incomparable in its power. As the application of the 
Darwinian model expands to other fields of knowledge, 
evolution emerges as the primary and unrivaled process 
in the entire universe—indeed, the source of all; in fact, 
the only such source there is.  Conservation appears to 
be a distant cousin of evolution—its mere consequence 
that depends on evolution. 
The image of conservation that emerges from 
the Darwinian model is in sharp contrast with the view 
of conservation that is prevalent in other disciplines.  In 
physics and chemistry, for example, the law of 
conservation is unquestionably one of the most 
important, if not the most important law in the universe.  
The treatment of conservation in the Darwinian model 
creates contradictions with other disciplines that also 
deal with both conservation and evolution and that view 
them largely as equals. 
The way the Darwinian model treats 
conservation is very ambiguous. On one hand, the 
model emphasizes survival—that is, a form of 
conservation--as the sole consequence of evolution.  Yet 
the role of conservation is purely subsidiary.  It does not 
really do anything.  Even non-conservation that in 
scientific circles hardly has a status equal to that of 
conservation seems to play a more prominent role than 
conservation; at least it does something by winnowing 
out unviable variations. Conservation merely follows as a 
consequence of this elimination. Tee Guidotti cogently 
summarized in his piece for American Scientists:  “What 
Darwin called natural selection is simply this fact of 
elimination” [14]. Darwin’s own description of natural 
selection emphatically stresses the role of                           
non-conservation. In his discussion of natural selection 
at the beginning of chapter IV of his On the Origin of 
Species Darwin writes: “we may feel sure that any 
variation in the least degree injurious would be rigidly 
destroyed. This preservation of favourable variations and 
the rejection of injurious variations, I call Natural 
Selection” [1, p. 78].  The conflict in the way that 
science in general views conservation and the way that 
the Darwinian model treats it has led Jacques Monod, a 
prominent molecular biologist and a Nobel laureate, to 
draw a paradoxical conclusion.  As he writes in his book 
Chance and Necessity, “For modern theory evolution is 
not a property of living beings, since it stems                        
from the very imperfections of the conserving 
mechanism” [15, p. 116]. 
How can one reconcile the powerful image of 
conservation that we see in other disciplines with the 
weak role assigned to it in the Darwinian model of 
evolution—a role that is in no way equal to mighty 
evolution?  There are only two possibilities that follow 
from this contradiction: either conservation is not 
universal or the Darwinian model is flawed.   
There is not a single field of science that does 
not recognize the law of conservation as ubiquitous and 
universal.  One cannot point to any scientific discipline, 
other than biology, that would assign an equal status to 
conservation and non-conservation. There is no 
universal law of non-conservation. Moreover, if in the 
case of conservation one can point to the unique nature 
of the universe as its source, there is no known source 
for non-conservation to which one can refer.  Thus, the 
anomaly with regard to conservation creates tension 
between the Darwinian model and those fields of 
knowledge where conservation plays a central role. 
Unlike theories, universals are hard to disprove.  
Indeed, history of human knowledge abounds in 
theories that had once been widely accepted and highly 
respected but were eventually superseded by more 
powerful rivals.  The change was not due to a proof that 
the theory was wrong, just that it was not powerful 
enough.  The rival simply offered more possibilities and 
included the old theory as its particular case—that is, 
case that was still valid under specific conditions or 
assumptions—thus conserving it.  No one has abolished 
Euclidean geometry that still remains valid even though 
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other more powerful theories of space have come into 
existence. 
The fate of Ptolemy’s geocentric theory is 
another good case in point. This theory had everything 
that a successful theory needed:  logical consistency, 
observational verification, and a high degree of 
predictability. It had numerous practical applications that 
are still in use today, for example, in navigational 
systems. It did contain some anomalies related to 
translation in space, but these anomalies did not appear 
to be very significant and some additional hypotheses 
explained them quite well. By all standard, even 
contemporary ones, this theory was a total success.  
And yet, eventually another theory has superseded it.   
The reason for change was not the rejection of 
the feature that was widely regarded as universal—the 
uniformity of translation in space—but rather in the 
affirmation of this principle and the formulation of a new 
theoretical approach based on the assumption that the 
Sun, not the Earth, was in the center of the universe 
and that celestial bodies moved around the Sun, rather 
than the Earth. The foundational premise of the 
Ptolemaic system has eventually been superseded by 
another and more powerful one—one that has offered 
more possibilities and included the geocentric theory as 
its particular case--that is, one that is valid under special 
conditions or assumptions. 
The story of the geocentric theory is compelling.  
It tells us that success is not a sufficient criterion of 
validity.  Even a very successful theory may still contain 
contradictions.  Resolving these contradictions requires a 
revision of the model. The contradiction between the 
Darwinian model of evolution and the universality of 
conservation is hard to dismiss or explain away. 
The Problem with Variability 
Evolution is a form of movement.  Static 
conditions of equilibrium cannot generate movement.  
Movement requires some initial instability, 
disequilibrium, or a low entropy state. 
In the Darwinian model the process of evolution 
starts with initial variations that are a result of 
randomness or chance.  Randomness thus plays an 
important role in the Darwinian model. James MacAllister 
summarizes it this way: “The Modern Synthesis toolbox 
holds only one tool: the mistake, the blind random 
mutation” [16]. According to Arkady Plotnitsky, “from 
Darwin on, chance is seen as an essential force in 
evolution, which gives the concept of chance a central 
role in the structure of evolutionary theory, especially as 
it is developed in Gould’s work, including in this book 
[The Structure of Evolutionary Theory]” [17, paragraph 
9, 18]. 
However, randomness is not associated with low 
entropy; on the contrary, it is associated with high 
entropy and disorder [19]. The Darwinian model does 
not explain how a state of high entropy and disorder 
produces movement. It does not explain how the state 
of disequilibrium, or order, can result from one of 
equilibrium, or disorder. Moreover it does not even 
discuss the relationship between equilibrium/
randomness and disequilibrium/order. 
There is also another problem related to 
variability. The Darwinian model asserts that 
randomness is the source of initial variations. This 
assertion may very well be true but there is no way of 
proving it.  The assertion of randomness as a source of 
initial variations requires at minimum an a priori 
assumption that what occurs in a particular case is 
random.  An a priori assumption is not a fact.  In many 
ways, it is a premise that serves as the basis for 
constructing a theory.  An a priori assumption has a 
probability of at least fifty per cent of being false.  Its 
selection is an act of arbitrariness.  In some sense, by 
constructing a model on the basis an arbitrary 
assumption one takes a chance with no guarantees.   
Scientific methodology has only one solution for 
the problem that a priori assumptions pose:  they should 
at least pass the test of rational justification. Rational 
justification does not prove that an assumption is right 
or wrong, but it does show that our assumption is not 
entirely arbitrary since it obeys the rules of logic and 
reason.  It also shows that at least to some extent we 
control theory rather than theory controls us.   
The simple fact is that there is absolutely no 
way to provide a rational justification for the existence 
of randomness or, for that matter, order, in any 
particular case. This is not to say that randomness and 
order do not exist. In fact, they may very well exist, but 
there is no way of proving their existence in specific 
cases. As many logicians, mathematicians, and computer 
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scientists have convincingly argued, a set of numbers 
may show randomness, but there is no guarantee and 
no proof that if we extend this set indefinitely, it will not 
reveal some underlying order. Hans Primas, for example, 
shows that if axiomatic principle, such as determinism, 
cannot be satisfied, “it can be enforced by choosing a 
larger state space” [20]. Such enforcement, according to 
Primas, is perfectly compatible with mathematical 
probability theory because: 
 Every mathematically formulated dynamics of 
statistically reproducible events can be extended to a 
description in terms of a one-parameter group of 
automorphisms on an enlarged mathematical structure 
which describes a fictitious hidden determinism.  
Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical 
probability theory is only a weak generalization of 
determinism [20, p. 1]. 
 Jean Bricmont also sees ontic determinism 
lurking behind the appearance of quantum                
randomness [21, 22].  Even quantum randomness and 
uncertainty that have been a standard of modern view 
of physical reality since the original formulation of 
quantum theory in the 1930s are no longer a                  
certainty [23]. 
The Darwinian model can and does offer a proof 
that mutations exist.  However, it does not and cannot 
prove that they are random.  The lack of proof means in 
this case that there is at least a fifty per cent chance 
that initial variations may be a result of some underlying 
order, which would be an anathema to the Darwinian 
model.  Again, this is not to say that initial variations are 
not random. This is to say, however, that there is no 
way of proving their randomness. The lack of 
justification means that we do not have rational control 
over theory, which effectively makes theory subjective 
and arbitrary.  It is precisely the case when a possibility 
of theory controlling us is dangerously strong. 
There are a growing number of biologists who 
dispute the critical assumption of randomness.  Kevin 
Laland, for example, finds that “much variation is not 
random because developmental processes                     
generate certain forms more readily than                     
others” [4, 24].  Christian de Duve also offers an 
objection to randomness.  In one of his widely publicized 
quotes that is all over the Internet, Christian de Duve, 
the author of A Guided Tour of a Living Cell, opines:  
 If you equate the probability of the birth of a 
bacteria cell to chance assembly of its atoms, eternity 
will not suffice to produce one... Faced with the 
enormous sum of lucky draws behind the success of the 
evolutionary game, one may legitimately wonder to 
what extent this success is actually written into the 
fabric of the universe [25].   
 Paleontologist Simon Conway Morris feels the 
need for a research program that might reveal “a deeper 
fabric to biology in which Darwinian evolution remains 
central as the agency, but the nodes of occupation are 
effectively predetermined from the Big Bang” (26, pp. 
309-310]. Again, this is not to argue against 
randomness or, for that matter, for it.  This is simply to 
point out the intensity of the debate about randomness 
and the degree of disagreement even among biologists, 
which signals a lack of control over the theory. 
 One can sense this lack of control in 
inconsistencies of interpretations provided by the 
proponents of the Darwinian model.  Although they 
regard variability that originates in random mutations as 
essential for evolution, they also display a persistent 
tendency to trace evolution to a common source—a 
progenitor [27]. Evolutionary biologists construct 
elaborate phylogenetic trees that originate in some 
common ancestor. Lynn Margulis points to this 
inconsistency when she criticizes “modelers of ‘the tree 
of life’” who choose to ignore “alternative 
topologies” [28, p. 194]]. There was not much variability 
in primordial cells that looked pretty much alike; yet this 
fact did not prevent evolution from taking place. These 
heated debates illustrate the dissensions that the 
Darwinian model generates. 
Since evolution is widely regarded as universal, 
we should be able to find a confirmation of the 
argument that variability is essential for evolution at 
spheres other than the biological one. Yet this is not the 
case.  For example, the evolution that we observe in the 
microscopic world does not reveal any initial variability, 
either on the level of subatomic particles or on the 
atomic level.  We do not find this confirmation on the 
molecular level either. Hydrogen is the most common 
element in our universe and all hydrogen molecules are 
alike.    All other elements are a result of subsequent 
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evolution; they are not a precondition for evolution on 
the molecular level.  The simple fact is that low or even 
non-existent variability does not prevent evolution from 
taking place. 
Finally, the claim that random variations are the 
source of evolutionary change has produced another 
controversy.  The challenge comes from the proponents 
of Intelligent Design and creationism who argue that 
evolution resulting from random variations is statistically 
improbable, if not indeed impossible [86, 87, 88].  The 
response from the proponents of the Darwinian model 
has been forceful [89,90]. However, it has not been 
conclusive and is riddled with additional problems that 
will be discussed later. 
The Problem of Discontinuity 
There is another issue in the Darwinian model 
that remains unresolved.  It is the issue of discontinuity.  
According to the Darwinian model, evolution occurs 
primarily as a continuous steady process of small 
incremental changes [29, p. 155]. Based on this view, 
the record of transition from one species to another 
should include a large number of transitional forms.  
However, there are very few such transitional forms 
found in geological or paleontological records. 
This lack of evidence for transition posed back in 
the 19th century and continues to pose now a serious 
problem for the proponents of the Darwinian model.  
Creationists, among others, point to the absence of 
evidence for transitional forms as their strongest 
argument in favor of creation and against evolution.  
Darwin was not unaware of this problem.  In his On the 
Origin of Species he asks:  
 Why then is not every geological formation and 
every stratum full of such intermediate links?  Geology 
assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated 
organic chain; and this, perhaps is the gravest objection 
which can be urged against my theory [1, p. 246]. 
 Darwin attributed this problem with evidence to 
the “extreme imperfection of the geological                   
record” [1, p. 246].  As reasonable as this argument 
may be, it does not confront a deeper problem faced by 
the Darwinian model—the problem of discontinuity. The 
emergence of new species is not the only type of 
discontinuous phenomena that are so abundant in the 
history of evolution.  The history of life on Earth 
provides evidence of major disruptions, leaps, and 
reversals. In addition to sudden explosions in variety 
and numbers of species, such as the Cambrian explosion 
of life forms, there were also dramatic mass extinctions 
of a large number of species—similar to the one that 
occurred at the end of the Cretaceous period that ended 
the reign of dinosaurs [30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. In addition 
to five big extinctions, fossil records reveal numerous 
extinction events at all scales.  According to geophysicist 
David Jablonski, at least 95 percent of all species that 
have ever lived have become extinct.  In a period of less 
than a million years—a very brief period in geological 
terms, the “Big Five” global extinctions eliminated over 
50 percent of living species and made a huge impact on 
many different organisms [35]. (Hlodan 2007). It is hard 
to explain the events of this magnitude by contingent 
circumstances or chance. The Darwinian model 
obviously has some explaining to do, which would 
require confronting the general problem of discontinuity 
head on. 
 There have been several attempts by theorists 
of evolution to address this problem, some more 
successful than others.  Willis Overton and Hayne Reese 
argue in their provocative article that the reason for the 
existence of the problem of discontinuity is primarily 
epistemological—that is, how we view reality, rather 
than what reality actually is.  According to Overton and 
Reese, there are two basic ways of conceptualizing 
reality: constancy and change. If one recognizes 
constancy as ontologically primary, then one sees 
evolution as development in which effects are explained 
in terms of antecedent causes. The recognition of 
change as ontologically primary precludes such causal 
explanation.  Change appears as an intrinsic property of 
reality, which precludes any causal explanation.  Overton 
and Reese regard development (continuity) and change/
novelty (discontinuity) as two independent a priori 
principles that organize our knowledge. As a priori 
principles, they are incompatible with and 
incommensurable to each other.  The best evidence 
each perspective will produce will be insufficient for their 
opponents.  Thus, Overton and Reese conclude, “will the 
debate continue” [36, p. 120].  
Peter Damerow has tried to explain the 
emergence of discontinuities in evolution as a result of 
differences in scale between local interactions and global 
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effects. In his view, “evolutionary progress appears 
continuous on the level of the individual,                             
but discontinuous on the level of a whole 
population“ [29, p. 155].  Moreover, he argues, these 
effects are purely statistical.  As Damerow explains,  
 I pointed out that discontinuities in evolution 
appear primarily as statistical effects of small individual 
changes, but that this is not their real nature. They 
rather represent qualitative changes in a population or, 
more generally, in an indefinite set of individual                    
events [29, pp. 158-59].   
The theory of punctuated equilibrium formulated 
by two renowned paleontologists Niles Eldredge and 
Stephen Gould has been by far the most successful 
attempt to confront discontinuities in that it has 
attracted the most attention. However, it has also 
proved to be one of the biggest sources of controversy 
in the study of evolution.  Punctuated equilibrium has 
turned the problem of discontinuity into a major issue in 
evolutionary biology [37].  
Eldredge and Gould also trace global 
speciation—the emergence of new species—to 
incremental continuous changes that occur on the local 
level.  They argue that favorable variations can become 
stabilized in relatively small and isolated populations—
what they call “reproductive isolation”--where they 
would not be overwhelmed by interbreeding.  Once 
favorable variations are secure, natural selection will do 
its work and select them for fitness [37].  
As has been mentioned, the attempt by 
Eldredge and Gould to explain the absence of evidence 
for transitional forms has generated much controversy.  
The theory they have proposed effectively decouples the 
micro and macro level of evolution by bringing in 
accidental and external agents that create reproductive 
isolation [38, p. 648]. This explanation has given rise to 
an uncomfortable suggestion that “large-scale evolution 
is guided not by natural selection, but by a separate, 
though analogous, process” [38, p. 646].  Such claim 
could not fail to produce fierce and vitriolic debates that 
abound in the history of the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium [39, p. 24].  
Due to the failure of theorists to resolve 
conclusively the continuity-discontinuity issue, 
practitioners in evolutionary biology have had little 
choice but to resort to ad hoc pragmatic explanations 
that heavily rely on contingency [40]. Like randomness 
that characterizes much of the Darwinian model [17], 
chance and contingency also put such explanations on a 
shaky foundation. Just as randomness, chance and 
contingency also cannot pass the test of rational 
justification, which makes their assumption an act of 
arbitrariness.  Obviously, explanations based on arbitrary 
assumptions will always appear to be subjective and, as 
such, open to objections and criticism. 
Moreover, the contingent and accidental causes 
brought to explain discontinuities in evolution are not 
even biological in nature.  More often than not, they are 
agents external to biology altogether.  It could be, for 
example, a comet, a massive volcanic eruption, or some 
other such event.  Using contingency and, moreover, 
contingency that is not related to biological processes, 
puts the Darwinian model in double jeopardy.  One can 
accept contingency in one or two cases but when we 
deal with five or more major discontinuous events, as is 
the case with mass extinctions, one finds a contingency 
explanation hard to swallow, especially if the causes 
come from outside biology. 
The Controversy Over Competition/Egotism vs. 
Cooperation/Altruism 
As has been indicated earlier, the term “natural 
selection” is a misnomer.  When used by itself, it has no 
meaning since in the Darwinian model there are no 
selectionists and no actual selection is taking place.  This 
term derives its meaning from another concept widely 
used by Darwin and his followers “the struggle for 
survival.” As Darwin explains in his On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, 
organisms constantly struggle--either against each other 
or against elements—to survive under conditions of 
limited resources.  In the course of this struggle some 
will endure and others will become extinct.  This 
struggle is the process of natural selection. 
As Darwin was well aware, the struggle for 
survival may take different forms.  It occurs either 
between different species (interspecific) or within the 
same species (intraspecific); it may involve competition 
or cooperation.  Although Darwin recognizes the role 
that cooperation may play in evolution, the primary 
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focus in his book is on competition to which devotes 
much more attention than to cooperation. 
The new evolutionary synthesis of the 1930s 
and 1940s has inherited the focus on competition from 
Darwin’s original formulation.  The addition of genetics 
was particularly important in this regard.  The proverbial 
“selfish” gene provided support that further bolstered 
the focus on competition [41]. As a result, the modern 
Darwinian model of evolution has firmly embraced the 
notion that competition is indeed the principal engine of 
evolution [42, 43, 44].  
This view dominated the study of evolution until 
the mid-1970s.  The publication of Sociobiology: The 
New Synthesis by E. O. Wilson was a decisive departure 
from the traditional focus on competition.  In this book 
and in his subsequent contributions Wilson formulated a 
new perspective that has challenged the view that 
nature was essentially “egotistic” and competition was 
the main engine of evolution [45, 46, 47, 48, 49].  
The new perspective has quickly gained 
momentum.  Its proponents have published numerous 
theoretical and empirical studies where they develop 
their main argument that “altruism,” not “egotism,” is 
the dominant characteristic of nature, and that 
cooperation, not competition, drives evolution [47, 46].  
Some champions of the new perspective are even calling 
for a complete revision or even abandonment of the 
Darwinian model.  The following statement by James 
MacAllister at the Royal Society evolution meeting in 
London has captured headlines: 
 Darwinian competition causes not the evolution 
of species but the destruction of species. It is 
collaboration in its various forms that causes biological 
evolution.  Hence I’m surprised by calls for extending 
the neo-Darwinian Evolutionary Synthesis.  You can’t 
extend something that is broken.  Surely what is needed 
now, after 65 years, is using the empirical evidence to 
develop a new paradigm for biological evolution  [16].   
 John Stewart another proponent of the 
cooperative perspective has widely publicized a view 
that challenges the Darwinian model on two counts.  Not 
only does he argue that cooperation plays a more 
important role in evolution than competition, but he also 
insists that evolution has a direction that is defined by 
cooperative symbiotic interactions among                   
organisms [50].   
Despite decades of fierce and often vitriolic 
debates, the controversy still continues. Many who study 
evolution try to reconcile the two sides [51, 52], but 
despite their efforts peace remains elusive. The 
community of evolutionary biologists continues to be 
deeply divided. 
In many ways, the eruption of this controversy 
is due to inconsistency of the Darwinian model itself.  
This model emphasizes adaptation as the principal mode 
of interaction between the organism and the 
environment that plays a crucial role in evolution.  By 
adapting to the environment an organism increases its 
fitness, thus evolving and improving its chances for 
survival. Since the orientation of adaptation is always 
towards environment and its objects, rather than toward 
the organism itself, this mode of interaction is not, in 
this sense, “egotistic” and could well be described as 
“altruistic.“  
At the same time, the Darwinian model 
recognizes the important role that reproduction—for 
example, reproduction of genetic variations--plays in 
evolution.  It maintains that without reproduction of 
variations, there can be no evolution.  The focus of 
reproduction is on whatever it is that it reproduces, not 
on the environment. For example, genes use available 
resources to reproduce themselves.  In other words, 
reproduction involves the inclusion, or assimilation, of 
objects/resources available in the environment into the 
internal functional operations of the organism. The 
object in this case is the internal function, not the 
environment.  Since the orientation in assimilation is 
toward the internal function, rather than the 
environment, it may well be described, in this sense, as 
“egotistic.” Dawkins has a good reason to describe 
genes as selfish [41].    
Thus, according to the Darwinian model, both 
the assimilative (“egotistic”) and the adaptive 
(“altruistic”) mode of interaction play an important role 
in the life and evolution of organisms.  However, while 
recognizing the importance of both assimilation and 
adaptation, the Darwinian model does not explain the 
relationship between the two. If assimilation is important 
on the genetic micro level, how does adaptation emerge 
on more advanced levels of the organism’s 
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development?  Does assimilation lead to adaptation?  
How come that the initial “selfishness” of the gene has 
adaptive “altruistic” consequences?    
The Darwinian model does not offer any answer 
to these questions. In fact, it does not really discuss the 
relationship between assimilation and adaptation and 
treats them as largely separate modes that are opposed 
to each other. The proponents of the Darwinian model 
have no choice by to emphasize one over the other, 
which is what leads to confusion and controversy. The 
only way to resolve this controversy is to understand the 
relationship between assimilation and adaptation. The 
Darwinian model does not provide such understanding.  
Moreover, it does not even offer much of a discussion of 
this issue. 
The Problem of Consciousness 
There is hardly a problem more central to the 
Darwinian project that the problem of mind and 
consciousness. After all, the intention that motivates this 
project is to prove that the evolution of nature is 
unguided and unplanned.  Consequently, it must show 
that there is no intelligence behind the evolution and all 
its wonderful creations, including humans, are products 
of spontaneous forces of nature that in principle can 
have no idea about the outcomes of their actions.  There 
is nothing that can prove this point more convincingly 
than by demonstrating that spontaneous and blind 
forces of evolution can produce intelligence that is 
capable of reflecting on itself and on the forces that 
produced it. 
Yet, as important as this problem is, the 
Darwinian model has so far proven to be incapable of 
resolving it. Years of research by evolutionary biologists 
and paleontologists aided by studies of mind and 
consciousness in a variety of disciplines that include 
psychology, neuroscience, neuroquantology, computer 
science, philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and 
others have not produced any solution. Despite 
numerous studies, an extensive and constantly growing 
body of literature, and over a dozen theoretical 
perspectives on the way mind and consciousness              
work [53], we are no closer today to getting answers 
than we were at the beginning of the Darwinian                
project [54, 55]. 
Daniel Dennet’s book is perhaps the most 
successful current application of the Darwinian model to 
mind, thinking, and consciousness [56]. However, even 
this relatively successful venture raises more questions 
that it provides answers.  For one thing, Dennet’s 
application of the Darwinian model has required the 
postulation of memes—mental equivalents of genes 
whose existence is yet to be proven and whose 
emergence, if we are to take Dennet’s word for it, may 
very well have been a happy accident. As Dennet’s story 
goes, after their emergence memes literally invaded 
human brains and turned them into human minds.  ”Our 
thinking,” Dennet concludes, “is enabled by the 
installation of a virtual machine made of virtual 
machines made by virtual machines” [56, p. 341].  This 
formulation reminds one of Winston Churchill’s famous 
adage about “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an 
enigma” to which one is tempted to add “enclosed in a 
puzzle” to compound the mystery. 
So, the failure to explain the emergence of mind 
and the rise of consciousness does not appear to be due 
to a lack of trying. There seems to be a conceptual 
obstacle to resolving this problem.  Pierre Blanquet, 
among others, views it as a challenge not just for 
science but also, and primarily, for philosophy [57].   
There are even some considerations that 
suggest that the Darwinian model in principle may very 
well be incapable of solving the problem of the origin of 
mind and consciousness, and consequently, explain the 
rise of humanity.  According to this model, biological 
evolution rewards biological advantages. It sees 
fitness—biological fitness in the case of biological 
organisms—as the most important criterion in 
determining which organism gets rewarded and which 
does not.  Mind and consciousness are decidedly not 
biological properties. Consequently, they offer no 
biological advantages. This is not to say that they do not 
offer any advantages; they most certainly do and these 
advantages may have implications for biological success.  
However, these advantages are not strictly speaking 
biological.  Therefore, according to the Darwinian model, 
the evolutionary success of human species should not 
depend on mind and consciousness; and, in fact, such 
dependency may not actually exist, if one is to take 
seriously the current sustainability crisis that we 
experience.   
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Yet the Darwinian model insists that since 
human species dominate nature, evolution must favor 
mind and consciousness. What immediate biological 
advantages do they offer?  The advantages of having 
the capacity to perform symbolic operations and reflect 
on them are not immediately clear. A human infant has 
no biological advantages over a baby chimp.  Human 
babies do not even have cognitive advantages over a 
chimp in the first year of their life [58, 59]. In the 
framework of the Darwinian project, the conclusion that 
biological evolution rewards non-biological traits cannot 
be unacceptable.  If biological evolution rewards mind 
and consciousness, nature must have some means and 
ways to appreciate the significance of these                          
non-biological traits—an anathema to the Darwinian 
project. 
The emergence of human species and the rise 
of consciousness represent a discontinuity that has 
irrevocably changed the natural balance in human 
favor.  In order to resolve the problem of the origin of 
mind and consciousness, the Darwinian model must 
explain discontinuity. As has been shown earlier, the 
only Darwinian strategy for dealing with discontinuity 
involves multiplying hypotheses and bringing in factors 
from outside biology. Although, as has also been 
explained, this strategy is not unproblematic, even this 
questionable strategy is unusable in the case of 
consciousness. Using this strategy in resolving the 
problem of consciousness will inevitably require positing 
the existence of at least some predisposition toward 
consciousness in nature, which contradict the main 
thrust of the Darwinian project. 
Therefore, the strategy of dealing with 
discontinuity has to change.  The new strategy should 
explain discontinuities, including the emergence of mind 
and consciousness, as arising from biological processes.  
As has been shown earlier, evolution theorists relate the 
problem of discontinuity to the broader problem of the 
relationship between equilibrium and disequilibrium.  
The debates provoked by the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium suggest that the solution of the problem of 
discontinuity can only emerge from resolving the more 
fundamental problem of the relationship between 
equilibrium and disequilibrium, which will require a 
revision of the entire Darwinian model since it already 
has an established strategy for dealing with 
discontinuities. There is no evidence of even a possibility 
of such revision in contemporary biology and 
evolutionary studies. 
Finally and most importantly, the Darwinian model 
explains the emergence of order out of chaos.  New 
species that represent a different level of organization 
emerge out of random mutations or some contingent 
influences that have little to do with biology.  In other 
words, it posits reality as chaotic.  Order, according to 
the Darwinian model, actually emerges as a result of 
natural selection. Natural selection eliminates 
unfavorable traits that are                     
disadvantageous.  Consequently, order is what is left 
when disorder is removed. If order is what is left, then it 
must exist, at least in some incipient form, prior to 
the elimination of disorder, which means that order is 
not created and that it is always there. Such conclusion 
leads to yet another paradox that the Darwinian model 
creates. 
 The unresolved problems and controversies 
reveal limitations of the Darwinian model. The model 
requires additional hypotheses and assumptions, some 
arbitrary, which makes its application bulky and often 
unwieldy. As a result, the model loses its universal 
appeal both in biology and in other disciplines. Some 
even call neo-Darwinism—the current incarnation of the 
Darwinian model—“the biggest mistake in the history of 
science” [16].  
The declining appeal of the Darwinian model 
leads to the emergence of other models and descriptions 
of the process of evolution.  In his contribution to New 
Scientist Mark Buchanan discusses some important 
alternatives to the Darwinian model of natural selection.  
He emphasizes, for example, the transformative role of 
lateral thinking and horizontal gene transfer between 
organisms in explaining the evolutionary process.  
Although the Darwinian model remains dominant, the 
article concludes, other evolutionary models deserve 
more attention [84]. 
 In today’s study of evolution, for example, 
regulation attracts increasingly more attention. Perhaps 
this reason explains the growing interest in epigenetics 
and phenotypes for understanding evolutions. Thanks to 
epigenetic controls (cellular mechanisms that affect how 
genes are expressed), even genetically identical 
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organisms can display very different traits.  Pioneering 
works by Eva Jablonka, Marion Lamb, and Michael 
Lachmann offer an alternative to the standard narrative 
of evolution [60, 61, 62]. Epigenetics may be one 
important reason “why the popular understanding of 
evolution might need revising,” but there are                        
others [63, 64]. 
Theory of self-organization is another 
perspective that generates a great deal of interest 
among biologists who seek to expand the range of 
theoretical tools that help address unresolved problems.  
Their particular interest is in understanding the 
relationship between natural selection and                            
self-organization [81, 82]. 
The differentiation emerging in the study of 
evolution creates an impression that there is not one but 
many very different evolutionary processes. This 
development undermines the very concept of evolution 
as a unitary process:  evolution can only be evolution if 
it is a unitary process.  This is not to say that it cannot 
take specific forms in different domains.  However, if we 
are to take evolution seriously, we must conclude that 
these specific forms should share some essential 
features characteristic for the process of evolution that 
connects all levels of organization of reality—from 
subatomic particles to humans and civilizations. In the 
absence of such features, different levels of organization 
appeared to be disconnected, which undermines the 
very concept of evolution as a universal process.  
This is not to argue that the Darwinian model is 
wrong and its critics are right. This is simply to point out 
the degree of disagreement and contention that exist in 
today’s study of evolution.  Indeed, disagreements can 
and often are productive but their enduring nature 
suggests that a rethinking of the Darwinian model may 
be in order. 
The history of scientific knowledge teaches us 
one important lesson:  even if a theory is successful, one 
can and must question its uniqueness [16]. Does the 
Darwinian project allow one and only one model or are 
other models possible?  The number of biologists calling 
for change in how evolution is conceptualized is growing 
rapidly. The pressure is mounting to include newly 
discovered phenomena, such as phenotypic plasticity, 
niche construction, inclusive inheritance and 
developmental bias [4]. Strong support comes from 
allied disciplines, particularly developmental biology, but 
also genomics, epi­genetics, ecology and social               
science [11, 65, 60, 61, 66].  Pigliucci is one among 
many who calls for creating an Extended Evolutionary                   
Synthesis [67].  
In view of the problems and controversies that 
remain unresolved in the Darwinian model, one can and, 
indeed, must explore possibilities of creating other viable 
models that will not have the problems and 
controversies that the current one has failed to resolve. 
Such exploration of other possibilities does not mean the 
rejection of the Darwinian project.  On the contrary, 
the motivation, if not the obligation, to explore other 
possibilities comes from the very imperative to conserve 
the project by moving it forward. 
Conservation, Creation, Evolution 
The conservation anomaly constitutes the most 
serious problem for the Darwinian model. The law of 
conservation is widely recognized as universally 
valid.  There is abundant empirical evidence that shows 
that conservation operates at many different levels of 
organization of reality.  If additional hypotheses can 
explain, if not entirely resolve, many other controversial 
issues that arise within the Darwinian model, there are 
no hypotheses that address the conservation 
anomaly. In fact, the Darwinian model does not even 
recognize the fact that it has a problem with 
conservation.  Moreover, there cannot in principle be 
any hypothesis that would explain this anomaly.  There 
are only two possibilities:  either the Darwinian model is 
right and then we have to revise our view of 
conservation as universal, in which case, the Darwinian 
model comes into conflict with many other disciplines 
and fields of knowledge that recognize the universality 
of conservation, or the Darwinian model is flawed and 
requires changes.  
  Since conservation is at the heart of the 
principal disagreement between the Darwinian model 
and the general recognition of universality of 
conservation, a closer look at conservation and the way 
it works is in order.  It is beyond the scope and intention 
of this word to discuss the source of conservation.  A 
simple acceptance of a well-known and widely 
recognized fact of its existence is certainly 
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sufficient. After all, the current theory of evolution does 
not dispute the fact of conservation but only raises 
doubts as to its universal application. One can safely 
start with a general observation that all systems, 
including biological ones, obey the law of conservation 
and, therefore, all have a natural propensity for 
conserving themselves. So how do systems conserve 
themselves?  How does conservation work? 
  All systems have functional operations--that is, 
they do something. The capacity to do what they do 
defines systems and is their most important property. 
They are what they do. Therefore, conservation is about 
conserving the functional operations of a system.   
  Functional operations are forms of action; and 
the only way to conserve action is by acting it out. 
Therefore, the more functional operations are used, the 
better they, and the system they make up, are 
conserved.  Evolution favors systems that exercise their 
functions as much as possible since such systems 
conserve themselves better. 
  In order to do what they do, 
systems require resources. Resources are critical for 
conservation.  Since resources are always finite, systems 
must be frugal and use their resources efficiently.  The 
more efficiently a system uses resources available to it, 
the better it is conserved. Evolution favors those 
systems that use their resources very efficiently. 
  However, no matter how frugal a system is, no 
matter how efficiently it uses its resources, these 
resources are still limited. While frugality helps and is 
rewarded by nature, it does not solve the fundamental 
problem of the finitude of resources. The only way to 
solve this problem is by accessing new resources.  Since 
it is the only way to solve this problem, evolution must 
favor systems that are capable of gaining access to new 
resources. 
  In order to gain access to new resources, a 
system must expand its range of possibilities—new ways 
and capacities to act—which requires new properties 
that are different from those that the system possesses. 
In other words, expanding the range of possibilities 
requires the inclusion of differences.  The inclusion of 
differences enriches the system and makes it more 
powerful.  Thus conservation requires changes that 
make a system more powerful.  In order to conserve 
itself, a system must evolve.  Conservation is the engine 
of evolution.  A system that does not evolve cannot 
conserve itself and begins to disintegrate [68].   
  All systems have a mechanism that regulates 
their functional operations. Since this mechanism 
regulates all functional operations, it has more                 
power—that is, its range of possibilities is wider—than 
each individual operation or their sum total.  Its power 
represents a multiplication, not a sum total, of all 
possibilities of all functional operations of the system.  In 
other words, its range of possibilities exceeds all 
possibilities of all functional operations of the system, 
which means that the regulatory mechanism is capable 
of recognizing what the system is not.  It has the power 
of negation.  Its level of organization is more powerful 
than that of any other level of organization in the system 
and, in this sense, it transcends the system.  Due to its 
power, the mechanism of regulation plays a critical role 
in systems.  It regulates functional operations and their 
interactions.  It also controls all interactions between the 
system and its environment. 
Regulation is a global function.  Its primary role 
is to conserve the entire system, which includes the 
mechanism of regulation. In other words, regulation also 
needs to be conserved. If regulation is not conserved, 
the entire system will start disintegrating.  The principle 
in conserving regulation is the same as conserving any 
other operation: it has to be active. The more regulation 
is activated, the better it is conserved. The most 
proximate source of activation is local functional 
operations of the system.  Thus, conservation of the 
regulatory mechanism requires multiple connections 
between this mechanism and local functional operations.  
Such integration involves both assimilation and 
adaptation. 
  Since the global level of organization at which 
regulation operates is the most powerful level in the 
entire system, regulation can assimilate local functional 
operations and include them into its operational 
schemes.  Donald Campbell points to this phenomenon 
in his discussion of the so-called “downward causality” 
that involves the influence operations at the local level 
by the more powerful level that regulates them [83]. 
The process of adaptation of local operations to 
the global regulatory level leads to the differentiation of 
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regulation. Once local functional operations are included, 
they have to adapt to the powerful global operations, 
which enriches them.  Such adaptation requires making 
global operations accessible to local ones, which means 
that the less powerful operations must “understand” 
more powerful ones. The translation of operations of 
greater power into the terms of operations of lesser 
power involves the emergence of a new frame that has 
sufficient power to include both the local and the global 
level as its particular cases. The emergence of this new 
frame marks the beginning of a new cycle in the 
evolution of the system. 
Using their own functional operations is not the 
only way systems can conserve themselves.  
Environment, including other systems, offers a large 
array of differences that can be used to conserve a 
system.  Since the regulatory mechanism is more 
powerful than all the local functional operations that 
constitute a system, it has the capacity to transcend the 
boundaries of the system.  It can sense excitations in 
the environment of the system, including excitations 
created by other systems, not just those that originate 
within the system.  The regulatory mechanism can also 
use these external excitations for its conservation. 
  Thus, regulation allows establishing connections 
between the system and its environment, including other 
systems.  The result of such structural coupling—the 
term used by neurobiologists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela [69]—of regulatory mechanisms of 
different systems is coordination of regulatory 
operations of different systems and the eventual 
emergence of a common regulatory mechanism and a 
new structural whole in which each constituent part 
becomes a subsystem. Such new integrated functional 
totality offers more possibilities and, consequently, to a 
greater array of resources. The common regulatory 
mechanism activates subsystems more often, which also 
helps in their conservation. 
  No matter which path the system                          
takes—internal, external, or a combination of the                  
two—the outcome is the same:  the emergence of new 
and more powerful levels of organization with a more 
extensive array of possibilities. The wider array of 
possibilities allows access to new resources and greater 
stability. As a result, the system is better conserved; and 
whatever is conserved better is “selected for fitness.” 
An example from early child development 
described by famous psychologist and cognitive scientist 
Jean Piaget in his book The Origin of Intelligence in 
Children is a good illustration of how systems                     
evolve [70]. For Piaget, the starting point in this 
development is reflexes that are triggered by nerve 
signals. Neural functions regulate physiological functions 
(for example, muscle contraction).  Signals from neurons 
activate physiological functions and thus conserve them.  
The more frequently this triggering occurs, the more 
active and, consequently, more stable these 
physiological functions are going to be. Thus neural 
networks regulate physiological functions and conserve 
them.  Combined together, neural and physiological 
functions constitute sensory-motor operations.  
Sensory-motor operations, or schemata in 
Piaget’s terminology, are also subject to the law of 
conservation.  They conserve themselves in two ways.  
First, they become increasingly oriented toward external 
reality in search of stimulation. This process evolves 
from casual encounters with stimuli to random groping 
in search of stimulation, and then to a more directed 
search for stimuli. The directed search leads to the 
gradual construction of the object on the level of 
sensory–motor operations (although not yet on the 
representational level). In other words, the child begins 
to simulate the presence of an object that the child has 
assimilated into sensory-motor operations in previous 
encounters (for example, simulating hand movements 
necessary for grasping an object).  As more objects are 
incorporated into sensory–motor schemata, the infant 
becomes increasingly more orientated toward the 
external environment.   
Sensory–motor operations (for example, tactile, 
audio, visual, gustatory, and other functions) also 
conserve themselves through mutual assimilation; that 
is, by including each other into their assimilative 
schemata. One example of such mutual assimilation is 
the activation of the audio function by the visual one, 
and vice versa.  Piaget discusses several such instances.   
For example, he notes that at a certain age when the 
infant hears mother’s voice, the child begins to turn the 
head, searching for the familiar image. Mutual 
assimilation of sensory-motor operations results in the 
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emergence of stable connections between them and 
common regulation.  As a result of the emergence of 
common regulation, each sensory-motor operation 
receives more stimulation and consequently is better 
preserved.  The common regulatory mechanism offers 
more possibilities for stimulation and, therefore, is more 
powerful than the level of each sensory-motor operation 
or their sum total; these operations become particular 
cases in this more powerful arrangement. The 
adaptation of sensory-motor operations to this new 
totality completes the process. This new and more 
powerful level of organization gives rise to permanent 
mental representations that are equivalents of               
sensory-motor operations on the level of neural 
organization. The process is completed at the beginning 
of the second year of life when infants begin to look for 
objects that are hidden from their direct view. The 
search for a hidden object indicates that the object is 
present in the child’s mind even when it is not in front of 
him or her; it indicates that the infant has already 
constructed a permanent mental image of the object.   
The emergence of neural networks that give rise 
to mental images marks the beginning of a new cycle in 
child development. While these networks regulate and 
conserve sensory-motor operations, they also require 
conservation. Such conservation involves mutual 
assimilation of networks, creation of a common 
regulatory level of organization with subsequent 
assimilation into and adaptation to this new totality.  
Regulation stabilizes these connections and open the 
path for the development of symbolic operations, or 
what we commonly call thinking. 
As this section shows, conservation is an 
essential property of the universe. It is due to the very 
unique nature of the universe. Conservation is truly 
universal since it is ubiquitous. The universe would not 
exist without it.  As this section also shows, conservation 
requires the creation of new and increasingly more 
powerful levels of organization that provide access to 
new resources that make conservation possible.  
Evolution is a result of this process. Thus conservation, 
creation, and evolution are integrally connected and 
cannot exist without each other.  Conservation fuels 
both creation and evolution and is, in turn, impossible 
without them.    
The New Model of Evolution 
Comparing the Two Models 
The recognition of conservation as the principal 
engine of evolution gives rise to a new model of the 
evolutionary process. This model shares some 
similarities with the Darwinian model but also has some 
significant differences.  Like the Darwinian model, the 
new model also sees evolution as unplanned, 
undirected, and non-teleological process; and this 
model, just like the Darwinian one does not involve any 
consciousness, natural or supernatural, that may be 
involved in guiding it. Although one could regard 
conservation as the goal that is intrinsic to the 
evolutionary process, this goal certainly does not 
amount to a telos—a final goal to be attained in a 
distant future; there are no final causes involved in the 
new model.  Conservation is not a final cause; it is a 
very proximate cause that is present at every stage of 
the evolutionary process. Thus the new model is 
absolutely compatible with the Darwinian project. 
The Darwinian model maintains that there is no 
direction in the evolution.  Yet, we do see evolutionary 
advances in the complexity of behavior and neural 
organization that supports this increasingly complex of 
behavior. Although the new model recognizes the 
existence of direction toward the emergence of 
increasingly more powerful levels of organization, but it 
also recognizes that the direction of evolution is not due 
to some preconceived or pre-ordained plan.  It emerges 
from the need to conserve the existing level of 
organization by creating a more powerful one—a 
proximate, rather than a final cause. 
In contrast to the Darwinian model in which 
conservation plays a subsidiary role, the new model 
emphasizes the equal and interdependent relationship 
between conservation and evolution. As many other 
fields of knowledge and disciplines do, the new model 
views conservation as truly universal. It does not 
consider any exceptions to conservation possible.  The 
recognition of the importance of conservation and the 
recovery of its universal status is a very important 
difference between the new model and its Darwinian 
predecessor. There is no conservation anomaly in the 
new model 
The principal focus of the Darwinian model is on 
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organisms, species, populations, etc.; in other words, it 
focuses on specific forms. By contrast, the new model 
focuses on levels of organization. A definition may at 
this point be in order.  What are levels of organization?  
Biology recognizes their existence and even uses the 
term. References to levels of organization are prominent 
in the life sciences and their philosophical study; they 
appear in introductory textbooks, as well as in               
cutting-edge research. Donald Campbell, for example, 
emphasizes that levels of organization are much more 
useful in discussion of biological evolution that arbitrary 
schemes of classification [83]. 
Yet, in spite of the ubiquity of the notion, levels 
of organization have received little explicit attention in 
biology or its philosophy. Usually they appear in the 
background as an implicit conceptual framework that is 
associated with vague intuitions.  
Since levels of organization have received little 
attention, there is no widely accepted definition of what 
a level of organization is, although many can and do 
identify specific levels of organization, such as subatomic 
and atomic, molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, 
organismal, group, population, community, ecosystem, 
landscape, biosphere, etc. In the absence of a general 
and widely applicable definition, a working definition 
may be helpful. A level of organization is a network of 
structurally connected components that has its own 
distinct level of combinatorial power—that is, it offers a 
certain distinct set of possibilities that represents its 
unique power. The characteristic feature of each level of 
organization is the array of possibilities that it offers.  
For example, the nervous system in an organism 
represents a level of organization that has sufficient 
combinatorial power to regulating biological functions of 
the organism. Human brain represents another level of 
organization that is capable of regulating neural 
functions. It is the most powerful level of organization 
that exists in nature. It derives its power from the 
capacity to create an infinite number of new and 
increasingly more powerful levels of organization that 
are capable of sustaining an equally infinite array of 
behavioral modes. 
Viewed from the perspective that focuses on 
specific forms—one that is used by the Darwinian model
--evolution appears to be an erratic, unsteady, and 
inconsistent process punctuated by sudden leaps and 
reversals that are hard to explain. By contrast, when 
viewed from the perspective that focuses on levels of 
organization, evolution emerges as a steady and 
consistent process that produces increasingly more 
powerful levels of organization.  In accordance with this 
perspective, the evolution shows no exceptions to 
conservation. No level of organization ever becomes 
extinct; all levels are conserved.  There are no reversals 
and no instances of non-conservation.  When one views 
the evolution from the perspective of forms, one can 
observe that about 95 percent of all living species have 
become extinct. Viewed from the perspective of levels of 
organization, one can see that levels of organization that 
once dominated the life world are no longer dominant; 
yet some species that represent levels of organization 
that lost their dominant position have survived to this 
day.  These levels of organization have not disappeared; 
they have just lost their dominant position to other more 
powerful levels of organization. Moreover, new and 
more powerful levels of organization include the 
essential features of the levels they displaced from the 
dominant position and, thus, also conserve them.  
Humans now dominate our planet. Some of the species 
that had dominated our planet before the emergence of 
human race disappeared but many continue to exist.  
However, the level of organization that sustains the 
human race retains all the essential features of all the 
levels of organization that have preceded it. 
Also, according to the perspective that focuses 
on levels of organization, each stage of the evolution 
has its own object of conservation. This object is always 
the most powerful global level of organization that 
supports the mechanism of regulation. There is no need 
to conserve other levels since the global level already 
conserves them. Nature is frugal and does not like 
conspicuous consumption.  It conserves only what needs 
to be conserved.  What has already been conserved 
does not need any additional conservation.   
Finally, when viewed from the perspective of 
levels of organization, one can see that the process of 
evolution represents a steady increase in power of new 
emerging levels of organization all the way to human 
brain that represents the most powerful level of 
organization in nature. Even though many specific 
organisms have become extinct, the evolution of neural 
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networks and modes of behavior they are capable of 
sustaining shows steady growth—no reversals and no 
extinctions.  Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a famous French 
philosopher and paleontologist, was one of the first who 
pointed to this steady increase in his famous book The 
Phenomenon of Man [71]. Today the growth of the 
power of the neural system in the course of the 
evolution is a well-documented fact [72].  
The focus on levels of organization has two 
main consequences.  First of all, since the object of 
conservation is the level of organization and the level of 
organization is always conserved, there is no need to 
trace evolutionary changes to specific organisms and no 
need to construct elaborate phylogenetic trees that 
postulate hypothetical progenitors [14]. Searching for 
common ancestors is a formidable enterprise that 
produces mixed results since empirical evidence for such 
progenitors is often lacking and may even be 
unattainable.  Also, the focus on specific forms privileges 
differentiation over integration.  The available evidence 
shows that both differentiation and integration play an 
equally important role in evolution and run parallel to 
each other.  We see as much evidence for differentiation 
as we see for integration. The evidence we have about 
evolutionary changes does not support interpretations 
that privilege differentiation—or, for that matter, 
integration.  A good example comes from linguistics.  
The Indo-European theory that has been successful in 
showing relationships among different languages in the 
Indo-European group has totally failed when applied to 
ethnic processes. For example, when archeologist and 
ethnologists tried to identify an ethnic group that spoke 
the hypothetical proto-Slavic language they failed to 
determine even the area where this hypothetical group 
could have been located.  The most likely location had 
no evidence of any population that had ever lived in that 
marshy area and no artifacts representing its culture 
[80]. Evolution is ultimately not about differentiation or 
integration, but rather about advances in power of 
organization from one kind of complexity to complexity 
of another kind.  The result of the evolution is cascading 
levels of organization nested matryoshka-style in each 
other.  
The focus on the global level of organization 
makes the new model applicable in fields other than 
biology where evolutionary processes are taking place 
without violating their autonomy. The Darwinian model 
poses a difficult choice:  either one has to reduce                
non-biological evolution to biological processes, as the 
Darwinian model often requires (for example, reducing 
evolution of psychology, behavior, society or culture to 
genetics), or one has to create a totally different model 
of evolution that fits a particular field (social evolution).  
In one case, the Darwinian model becomes excessively 
reductive and violates the autonomy of fields outside 
biology.  Another route leads to the proliferation of 
dramatically different evolutionary models. Such 
proliferation goes against the very conception of 
evolution as a unitary process. If we are to take 
evolution seriously, we must conclude that despite 
differences of the specific areas of instantiation, all these 
instances of evolution must have common features since 
evolution makes sense only as a unitary process.  The 
model that focuses on levels of organization is more 
universal since its application does not require reduction 
to biology and, therefore, does not violate the autonomy 
of specific fields where the model is applied. 
Conservation-the Engine of Evolution 
The recognition of conservation as the main 
engine of evolution makes the new model much simpler 
than the Darwinian one. Conservation replaces the bulky 
and problematic evolutionary mechanism used in                   
the Darwinian model that involves three                 
components-variability, reproduction, and natural 
selection.  
As has already been pointed out, variability is 
not an essential condition for evolution. Random 
variations require additional assumptions about the 
nature of reality that cannot stand the test of rational 
justification. Therefore, one has to recognize its 
subjective and arbitrary nature.  Such recognition makes 
the interpretations based on this assumption vulnerable.   
 In addition, the emphasis on random variations 
has generated the controversy with the advocates of 
Intelligent Design who argue that evolution based on 
random variations is statistically improbable, if not, 
indeed, impossible [86, 87, 88).  They often invoke an 
assertion made by British astronomer Fred Hoyle that 
the random emergence of a cell is as likely as a Boeing 
747 being created by a tornado sweeping through a 
junkyard. 
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The proponents of the Darwinian model have 
responded to this challenge. In their view, “[p]robability 
and statistics are well-developed disciplines with wide 
applicability to many branches of science, and it is not 
surprising that elaborate probabilistic arguments against 
evolution have been attempted” [88, p. 45].  
Responding to contentions by Dembski and              
Behe [86, 87, 88], Peter Olofsson, for example, 
demonstrates in his analysis that their arguments for 
design based on estimated mutation probabilities “must 
be purely speculative.”  He concludes that while such 
arguments may appear to be convincing, “[c]areful 
evaluation of these arguments reveals their 
inadequacies” [89, p. 45]. 
The proponents of the Darwinian model concede 
the problematic nature of chance but they further 
bolster their claim by arguing, as John Rennier does, 
that evolution does not depend on chance to create 
organisms, proteins or other entities.  Quite the 
opposite: natural selection, the principal known 
mechanism of evolution, harnesses nonrandom change 
by preserving “desirable” (adaptive) features and 
eliminating “undesirable” (non-adaptive) ones.  As long 
as the forces of selection stay constant, natural selection 
can push evolution in one direction and produce 
sophisticated structures in surprisingly short times [90]. 
 In support of his argument Rennier cites the 
example of complex effects that can be produced by 
mutations that arise in homeobox (Hox) family of 
development-regulating genes. 
 The problem with Rennier’s response and similar 
responses is that they rely on the positive effect of 
natural selection. The capacity of natural selection to 
“harness nonrandom change” implies the existence of 
some notion of positive or desirable change, which 
contradicts the very thrust of the Darwinian project that 
wants to make the case for the evolution as an 
undirected, unplanned, and non-teleological process.  
The example of the Hox family genes above also raises 
questions.  Since these genes are involved in regulation, 
they must operate on a more powerful level of 
organization, one wonders how this level has emerged 
and whether its emergence was due to random 
mutations.  
The endless debates between the proponents of 
the Darwinian model and the supporters of creationism 
and Intelligent Design appear to be utterly futile, as both 
sides have dug in their heels and refuse to budge.  
Neither side seems to be capable of claiming a victory.  
The fruitlessness of these debates makes one wonder 
why evolutionists would not try a different tack-after all, 
science is a creative enterprise that offers many 
possibilities.  Why do they persist in approach based on 
the assumption that is hard to justify and that 
opponents of the evolutionary approach use against 
them?  Why not try a different approach? 
Perhaps the most obvious answer to these 
questions is that there is no different approach.  The 
proponents of the Darwinian model cannot think of any 
other source of disequilibrium except randomness and 
chance to propel the evolution. The assumption of 
randomness also saves them from the conundrum of 
infinite regress, as every cause is also an effect that 
requires explanation. Random variations do not require 
any explanation; they just are. But perhaps the most 
important reason is the fact that the assumption of 
randomness and chance--that, as has been shown, is 
unjustifiable and highly problematic—is the premise that 
supports the Darwinian interpretation of the evolution as 
an unguided, unplanned, and non-teleological process.  
Unfortunately, this foundation on which the Darwinian 
model rests is rather weak. As has been indicated 
earlier, it is unjustifiable.  It also provides fuel to the 
critics who raise questions about the statistical 
improbability, if not impossibility, of evolution based on 
chance and randomness. Finally, sustaining the 
Darwinian model requires many additional hypotheses 
that make it very bulky and highly complex, which 
creates a challenge when the model is used in 
interpretations.  
The new model proposed in this study is much 
simpler. In accordance with this model, conservation 
that is ubiquitous in nature is all that is needed for 
evolution to take place. The application of the new 
model does not require, for example, any additional and 
problematic assumptions about the putative random 
nature of reality that cannot in principle pass the test of 
rational justification and, for this reason, must be 
recognized as arbitrary and subjective, which makes the 
interpretations based on this assumption vulnerable to 
criticism.   
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The demotion of variability as an essential 
condition for evolution also eliminates the contradiction 
between this requirement and the tendency to trace 
evolution to common ancestry, that is, to a source in 
which variability is limited or even non-existent.  This is 
not to say that variability is insignificant or unimportant.  
Variability provides differences, and inclusion of 
differences is certainly a factor in creating new and more 
powerful levels of organization, which advances 
evolution.  In this sense, variability is important. This is 
to say, however, that variability is only a valuable 
complementary factor that facilitates evolution, rather 
than a causal one.  
Replication is another factor that may not 
necessarily and always be conducive to evolution.  The 
Darwinian model recognizes that evolution is about 
survival and fitness. Survival requires resources.  
Successful fitness leads to successful replication.  But 
replication increases the number of organisms that use 
the same resources, which increases the depletion of 
these resources.  The depletion of resources is not 
conducive to survival and, consequently, to evolution.  
Darwin clearly points to this possibility, echoing a 
Malthusian argument, in his On the Origin of Species 
when he writes: “Hence, as more individuals are 
produced than can possibly survive, there must in every 
case be a struggle for existence, either one individual 
with another of the same species, or with the individuals 
of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of 
life” [1, p. 63]. Both variability and reproduction 
complement evolution, but this fact must not 
overshadow or replace the important role of 
conservation and the process of creating new and more 
powerful levels of organization that are both central to 
evolution. Outside conservation and the process of 
creation, neither variability nor reproduction can make 
evolution possible.   
As has been mentioned, natural selection is 
really a misnomer [73, 74].  Selection involves an act of 
selecting. It is worth reminding that the practice of 
artificial selection influenced Darwin in formulating his 
theory. However, there is nothing in the process of 
natural selection—and Darwin is very clear on this 
point—similar to an act of selection for advantageous 
features that is involved in the practice of artificial 
selection. In the Darwinian model there is only the 
struggle among organisms for survival under conditions 
of limited resources.  There is no selectionist involved.  
Therefore, natural selection is merely a phrase, a 
convenient expression that Darwin used to explain the 
struggle for survival. It is merely an outcome of the 
competition for limited resources that is not a necessary 
condition without which evolution cannot take place. 
Thus, conservation is the single most important 
factor that makes evolution possible. Indeed, 
conservation requires evolution and cannot exist without 
it.  The role of other factors discussed in the Darwinian 
model is complementary; it is in no way equivalent to 
the powerful role that conservation plays in evolution. 
Untangling the Discontinuity Problem 
As has been shown earlier, the current 
approaches toward resolving the problem of 
discontinuity within the Darwinian model are in many 
ways very different.  Damerow, for example, sees 
discontinuities as purely statistical effects on the macro 
level of the continuous changes—that is, changes in 
which one can trace causal effects to some antecedent 
factors—on the micro level [29, pp. 155-60]. By 
contrast, Eldredge and Gould invoke reproductive 
isolation as a way of mediating changes that occur on 
the micro and macro level [37]. However, despite their 
differences they share common features.  For one thing, 
they view continuity and discontinuity in terms of 
equilibrium and disequilibrium. They also see that there 
is some connection, even if mediated, between 
continuity/equilibrium on the micro level and 
discontinuity disequilibrium on the macro level.    
Thus, efforts to explain discontinuities within the 
Darwinian model point that the solution of the problem 
lies in the relationship between equilibrium and 
disequilibrium. However, since the Darwinian model 
does not discuss this relationship, it can only relate 
equilibrium and disequilibrium by bringing in factors that 
do not emerge directly from the model of the 
evolutionary process but have to be brought in from 
outside, either in the form of additional assumptions, 
such as chance and contingency, or in the form of facts 
that are not biological in origin. 
In contrast to the view that sees continuity and 
discontinuity as separate and diametrically opposed to 
each other, there are several contemporary theoretical 
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perspectives—such as systems theory, theory of 
emergence, complexity theory, theory of                          
self-organization, and others—that view both equilibrium 
and disequilibrium as two essential and closely 
interrelated aspects of reality that are complementary, 
rather than opposed to each other.  They believe that 
since both equilibrium and disequilibrium coexist within 
the same system, there is a direct link between the two.  
In their view, reality is neither chaotic nor orderly but 
always exists —in a felicitous description of Stuart 
Kauffman—“at the edge of chaos” [75, 76, p. 131]. The 
new perspectives believe that since equilibrium and 
disequilibrium coexist within the same system, they 
must be related to each other, even if the explanation of 
this relationship still remains elusive.  Consequently, 
they seek the solution of the problem of discontinuity in 
explaining this relationship [77].    
As the discussion of the relationship between 
conservation, creation, and evolution points out, the 
balance between equilibration and the production of 
disequilibrium is essential for conservation. It makes 
possible the emergence of new and increasingly more 
powerful levels of organization.  The emergence of such 
levels represents an evolutionary process in which 
incremental local interactions result in the emergence of 
new and increasingly more powerful macro levels of 
organization that cannot be reduced to the levels of 
organization from which they have emerged due to 
power differential.  
According to the description provided in this 
study, conservation leads to the creation of new and 
increasingly more powerful levels of organization. The 
process of creation involves both equilibration and the 
production of disequilibrium.  Although equilibration is a 
form of continuity, it produces, as has been explained, 
disequilibrium that is a source of discontinuity. Without 
understanding the close relationship between 
conservation, creation, and evolution, we cannot grasp 
the fundamental connection between equilibration and 
the production of disequilibrium, between equilibrium 
and disequilibrium.  As a result, equilibration and the 
production of disequilibrium will appear as two 
disconnected modes opposed to each other. Only in the 
context of conservation and the process of creation that 
it requires, we can grasp this connection—the fact that 
reality always balances on the cusp of equilibration and 
the production of disequilibrium, or equilibrium and 
disequilibrium.   
The discussion of the relationship between 
equilibration and the production of disequilibrium makes 
obvious the role of the balance between the two.  
Maintaining this balance does not require mediation. It is 
a product of direct and complementary relationship 
between equilibration and the production of 
disequilibrium. As equilibrium grows as a result of 
equilibration, so does disequilibrium as a result of the 
emergence of new and more powerful levels of 
organization that regulate interactions that have 
produced them. Without understanding the integral 
relationship between equilibration and the production of 
disequilibrium, the causal interaction between the two 
cannot be reconstructed and the effect will appear as a 
discontinuity. 
The insistence that the solution of the problem 
of discontinuity lies in the direct relationship between 
equilibrium/equilibration and the production of 
disequilibrium does not imply that contingency and 
chance do not have any role in evolution; they most 
certainly do. However, evolution has too many instances 
of discontinuity to explain all or even a significant 
number of them by resorting to contingency and 
chance—an assumption that does not pass the test of 
rational justification. If we excessively rely on such 
assumptions, we run the risk of allowing theory to 
control us, rather than make sure that we control 
theory. 
This discussion lays out only very general 
contours of the solution of the problem of discontinuity.  
No doubt, further theoretical elaboration is needed as 
well as the empirical evidence that will support it.  
However, by emphasizing the direct relationship 
between equilibration and the production of 
disequilibrium and thus removing this important 
theoretical stumbling block, the approach presented in 
this work opens the path toward a conclusive solution of 
this problem.  
Resolving the Controversy Over Competition/Egotism vs. 
Cooperation/Altruism 
The earlier discussion of the issue of 
competition/egotism vs. cooperation/altruism has shown 
that this controversy has roots in the two modes that 
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the organism uses in its interactions with the 
environment:  adaptation and assimilation.  Assimilation 
has an inward orientation; its object is the organism and 
its functional operations. Assimilation conserves these 
operations by including external objects into functional 
operations of the organism. In this sense, one can 
certainly describe assimilation as “egotistic.” By contrast, 
the orientation of adaptation is outward toward external 
objects and the environment, and away from organism 
and its functional operations.  In this sense, adaptation 
is essentially an “altruistic” mode that conserves the 
object. 
  As a mode of interaction with the environment, 
assimilation precedes adaptation. It is a result of the 
activation of functional operations of the organism by 
internal neural signals.  For example, internal neural 
signals trigger the movements of the mouth of a 
newborn even before this newborn begins to actively 
interact with the environment. There is no initial purpose 
to these movements other than exercising, thus 
conserving, this sensory-motor operation.  In another 
example, the child will grasp whatever touches the palm 
and activates neural receptors. Only later the child 
adapts this primary sensory-motor operation to other 
purposes.  Assimilation is the primary mode of 
conservation:  no assimilation, no conservation. 
  Conservation of assimilative operations creates 
new levels of organization. Since these new levels of 
organization are more powerful than that of initial 
assimilative operations that have created them, these 
operations have to adapt to these new levels. This 
adaptation conserves new levels of organization. If they 
are not conserved, the system will disintegrate. Thus 
organism “learns” adaptation, which leads to adaptive 
behavior. 
Assimilation precedes adaptation but this fact 
does not make it any more important than the latter. 
Both are intimately related--after all, it is assimilation 
that gives rise to adaptation.  Even though their roles 
are different, they are equally important for evolution. 
Assimilation creates new levels of organization; 
adaptation conserves them. Since both modes are 
equally important, they should be in balance.  Such 
balance is an essential condition for conservation and, 
consequently, for evolution. 
The Darwinian model recognizes the ”selfishness“ of 
genes as essential for variability and the evolutionary 
process that this model describes.  As a result, it has to 
recognize the competition among “selfish” genes as 
central to the evolutionary process. However, the 
Darwinian model also emphasizes adaptation as a mode 
of interactions that plays an important role in evolution. 
As has been indicated earlier, adaptation is 
essentially ”altruistic” in that it treats reality as 
autonomous from the organism.  Although cooperation 
does not necessarily require altruism, the association 
between the two is strong. 
The Darwinian model of evolution does not see 
conservation as central to evolution. Consequently, it 
does not consider or discuss the process of creation.  As 
a result, assimilation and adaptation appear as two 
separate modes opposed to each other; and the 
application of the Darwinian model requires making a 
choice where no choice should be made since both 
competition/assimilation and cooperation/adaptation are 
but two equal aspects of the same process and are 
equally important. The Darwinian model can only see 
assimilation and adaptation—and consequently, 
competition and cooperation—as two separate modes 
that are opposed to each other.  
The new model presented in this essay sees 
conservation as central to evolution.  Conservation 
requires the equilibration of functional operations.  Such 
equilibration establishes stable connections among 
various functions of organism. In the course of 
equilibration functions include each other into their 
respective operational schemes, which is a form of 
assimilation.  Their equilibration leads to the emergence 
of a new and more powerful level of organization. 
Conserving the new level requires its integration with 
the level of organization of functional operations from 
which the new level has emerged. Such integration 
involves adaptation of functional operations to the new 
and more powerful level of organization. Thus, the 
conservation of ”egotistic” functional operations leads to 
the emergence of “altruistic” adaptation. Conservation 
that starts with assimilation leads to the emergence of 
adaptation. Thus organism “learns” adaptation and 
adaptive forms of behavior. Subsequently, adaptive 
forms of behavior lead to the emergence of the capacity 
to recognize differences that eventually evolves into 
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awareness of autonomy and altruism that are essentially 
grounded in the initial egotism and egocentrism. 
The new model views assimilation and 
adaptation as two essential aspects of the same process 
of creation that complement each other. Assimilation 
creates new levels and adaptation conserves them. No 
new level of organization can emerge without conserving 
preceding levels.  Both aspects are equally important 
and complement each other in the process of 
creation.  Thus, the new model shows that there is no 
controversy between competition/egotism vs. 
cooperation/altruism. The controversy emerges only if 
the process of creation is not in the frame of 
vision.  Only when we do not consider this process 
competition/egotism and cooperation/altruism emerge 
as two distinct modes in opposition to each other. 
The New Model and the Problem of Mind and 
Consciousness  
Despite all the mysteries and paradoxes related 
to human mind, conservation is as much a part of what 
the mind is and does as it is of any other level of 
organization; and, as has been argued earlier, 
conservation inevitably leads to creating new and 
increasingly more powerful levels of organization (in this 
case, organization of neurons and neural networks).  
There is little difference in this capacity to create new 
levels of organization between human mind and the rest 
of nature; the only difference-and it is a major one-is 
that human mind can create an infinite number of such 
levels of organization.   
If we recognize that capacity for reflection is the 
most important property of human consciousness—and 
we do [78]. then we have to acknowledge that this 
capacity is the property that characterizes any form of 
regulation that exists in nature. The only difference 
between consciousness and other forms of regulation is 
the capacity of infinite reflection—that is, reflection upon 
reflection, or self-reflection, in the case of 
consciousness. No doubt this is an important distinction 
but not one that emerges from nowhere; its basic 
functional features emerge from numerous forms of 
regulation that have existed prior to the rise of 
consciousness. 
As has been indicated earlier, the problem of 
consciousness presents a special challenge to the 
Darwinian model. Tracing evolutionary advances to 
genetic mutations has some uncomfortable implications 
in the case of consciousness.  Genetic mutations are 
biological phenomena that offer advantages or 
disadvantages that are biological in nature.  
Consciousness is not a biological property and therefore 
does not offer advantages that are biological. The 
reason for selecting a property that offers no biological 
advantage must be non-biological.  Where does this 
reason come from?  Why does a biological evolution 
favor such selection?  The Darwinian model does not 
give a clear answer to these questions and has so far 
failed to solve the problem of consciousness.   
Moreover, there is an indication that the 
Darwinian model simply cannot solve this problem.  The 
emergence of consciousness has changed the balance of 
nature in favor of humanity. As such, this emergence 
represents a dramatic discontinuity in the evolution of 
life world.  The Darwinian explanation of discontinuities 
does not emerge from the evolutionary process itself; it 
requires making an arbitrary assumption and provide 
reasons of non-biological nature.  This approach may be 
uncomfortable in the case of biological discontinuities, 
but it is completely unusable in the case of 
consciousness. The Darwinian model cannot refer to any 
reason in or outside biology that could even potentially 
give rise to consciousness, other than some wild and 
totally unwarranted suppositions and speculations.  
The new model provides an approach that may 
help to understand and explain the emergence of mind 
and consciousness. According to this model, evolution is 
about creating new and increasingly more powerful 
levels of organization of reality. Conserving each level 
requires creating a new and more powerful one.  
Evolution, whether biological or not, always involves 
conservation. 
In accordance with the new model, the object of 
conservation is the level of organization, not traits, 
organisms, species, or populations. These may emerge 
and prosper, and then decline and become extinct.  The 
level of organization is always conserved and is never 
extinct.  Its conservation requires the creation of a new 
and more powerful level of organization that, in turn, 
also has to be conserved, and so ad infinitum. There is 
no limit to evolution.   
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Mind and consciousness represent the most 
powerful level of organization of reality. This level of 
organization has the capacity to create an infinite 
number of new and increasingly more powerful levels of 
organization. Consciousness operates on the symbolic 
level, which means that it uses symbols coded in neural 
connections and networks. The levels of symbolic 
organization created by consciousness also have to be 
conserved.  As in any other case, conservation of 
symbolic levels of organization also involves the creation 
of new and more powerful levels. The only difference 
with other cases is that there is no limit because there is 
always a possibility--nay, necessity--to create another 
level of organization.  But this is not all. There are 
billions of human beings that are capable of creating 
infinite number of new levels of organization. The 
combined capacity of all human minds is awesome.  
There are no limitations that one can even imagine. If 
we recognize that evolution is about the creation of new 
and more powerful level of organization, we begin to 
understand why evolution must favor the emergence of 
mind and consciousness. 
The awesome power of human mind comes 
from the capacity for reflection.  It offers a possibility of 
infinite reflection, reflection on reflection, and                       
self-reflection. The capacity for reflection has its roots in 
conservation and creation. Regulation is essential for 
conservation. Without regulation, systems cannot 
conserve themselves. 
Regulation involves reflection.  In order to 
regulate a system, its regulatory mechanism should have 
components that correspond to functional operations of 
the system it regulates; in other words, there should be 
one-to-one correspondences between the regulatory 
level and the level of organization of functional 
operations. These correspondences do not replicate 
functional operations because the regulatory level is 
more powerful; these correspondences are     
equivalents—analogues--that reflect functional 
operations, not copy them.  Thus reflection and 
regulation go together.  
No system, or organism can survive without 
regulation. Regulation is widespread throughout life 
world and, indeed, throughout the universe.  We can 
find it at all levels of organization. Regulation is an 
integral part of evolution [see 79].  As everything related 
to evolution, regulation has also evolved. The new forms 
of regulation that have appeared have inherited the 
essential features of regulation. Reflection is one of 
them. The infinite reflective capacity of human 
consciousness is a result of this evolution. 
This brief description certainly does not explain 
all the aspects and intricacies of human consciousness 
and mind. This complex subject will take many 
theoretical and empirical studies to reveal the way our 
mind and consciousness work. This study did not and 
could not aspire to achieve such goal. All it has tried to 
do is to open the path to understanding the connection 
between consciousness and evolution.   
The creation of new and increasingly more 
powerful levels of organization does point in a certain 
direction.  However, this direction is not a result of some 
preconceived plan; it is not a product of some 
consciousness.  Rather this direction emerges from the 
essential condition of the survival of our universe-its 
conservation; and mind and consciousness are merely 
its results—albeit the most important  
 To summarize, the new model of the 
evolutionary process represents an advance over the 
Darwinian one: 
 By emphasizing the role of conservation in the 
evolutionary process, the new model restores the 
universal status of conservation. 
 The emphasis on the role of conservation in the 
evolutionary process does not invalidate the Darwinian 
model.  Natural selection is a key concept in the 
Darwinian model.  This concept implies fitness between 
organism and its environment. Fitness is the result of 
the adaptation of an organism to its environment.  
Adaptation involves behavior—that is, the way organism 
acts in its environment.  Behavior is a general terms for 
the array of sensory-motor operations and their 
combinations that the organism is capable of 
performing.  Sensory-motor operations are functions of 
the nervous system that regulates them.  The array of 
possibilities that the nervous system offers defines the 
modes of behavior that the organism is capable of 
performing that ultimately determines the capacity of 
the organism to adapt to and create a fit with its 
environment.  This capacity, according to the Darwinian 
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model, plays a critical role in the survival of the 
organism and its evolution. 
 The new model does not contradict the thesis 
about natural selection and fitness. On the contrary, it 
expands and elaborates it further. According to the new 
model, the nervous system that represents the most 
powerful level of organization in an organism. It 
regulates all the physiological functions of the organism.  
It also regulates the organism’s sensory-motor 
operations—that is, the organism’s modes of behavior.  
Since behavior is critical for adaptation and consequently 
fitness, it plays a critical role in the capacity of the 
organism to survive. The diversity of possible modes of 
behavior, more than any other trait, is what determines 
the survivability of the organism.  Size was the principal 
survival strategy of dinosaurs. This strategy served them 
well in that it allowed dinosaurs at one point to 
dominate the Earth.  However, it was not a huge and 
powerful dinosaur, but a tiny mouse that ultimately 
prevailed in the struggle for survival—a tiny mouse with 
its capacity to function in the absence of direct sunlight 
and feed at night. 
 The nervous system represents the most 
powerful level of organization in nature.  The emphasis 
on levels of organization and their power in explaining 
the evolutionary process does not invalidate the 
Darwinian model. The Darwinian model remains 
perfectly valid if we focus on fit between organism and 
the environment, rather than the source of the fit.   The 
new model expands and further elaborates the 
Darwinian one; it includes the latter into its broader 
frame as a particular case that remains valid if the 
source of adaptation and fit is not in the focus of 
attention. 
 The focus on the nervous system as the most 
powerful level of organization does not exclude 
anatomical traits. These traits play an important role in 
interactions between the organism and its environment.  
There is still much to be known about the relationship 
between the evolution of anatomical traits and the 
evolution of the nervous system and the modes of 
behavior it can support.  However, there is no doubt 
that the nervous system of the organism represents a 
level of organization that is far more powerful that the 
level of organization of anatomical traits. 
 In accordance with the new model, the level of 
organization that matters most at each stage of the 
evolution is one that is most powerful because the 
evolution is about conservation, and it is precisely the 
most powerful level of organization that needs to be 
conserved.  The conservation of this level advances and 
defines further evolution. 
 The new model is parsimonious.  In contrast to 
the Darwinian model, it requires no additional 
hypotheses and assumptions. Parsimony makes the 
application of the new model in interpreting evolutionary 
changes easier and more efficient. 
 The new model explains the emergence of 
discontinuities as a result of the equilibration involved in 
incremental changes. It does not resort to any additional 
hypotheses regarding the nature of reality or attributes 
discontinuities to non-biological factors.  The focus on 
levels of organization helps understand that while there 
are discontinuities and leaps in the evolution, there are 
no and cannot be any reversals.  
 Unlike the Darwinian model, the new model of 
evolution does not violate the autonomy of fields other 
than biology where evolutionary processes also occur.  
Since the model emphasizes the important role of the 
most powerful level of organization at each stage of the 
evolution, it is inimical to any kind of reductionism of 
non-biological evolutionary processes to biology. This 
feature makes the new model more flexible in 
application to non-biological spheres and, in this sense, 
more universal. 
 The new model opens the path toward 
understanding the origin of human mind and 
consciousness. It helps understand why the conservation 
of constructs on the neural level of organization leads to 
the creation of new and more powerful levels of 
organization that sustain mental images, the capacity for 
symbolic operations, and consciousness with its capacity 
for reflection on reflection, or infinite levels of reflection. 
 Finally, and most importantly, the new model is 
perfectly compatible with the Darwinian project.  In fact, 
it enhances and further advances this project. 
Conclusion 
Evolution is not limited to biology or, for that 
matter, to any other field. It is truly 
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universal.  Everything in the universe is a result of the 
evolutionary process. This revision of the Darwinian 
project confirms this fundamental point. 
The revision does not involve the abandonment 
of the Darwinian project.  On the contrary, it enhances, 
advances, and thus conserves the project. It does not 
destroy the Darwinian model but merely creates a 
broader frame that includes this model as its particular 
case—that is, a case that is true under specific 
conditions or assumptions. Indeed, if one does not see 
the centrality of conservation as the source of evolution, 
the Darwinian model will appear to be viable.  This 
recognition raises an important question: Is there a 
compelling reason for embracing revision or, for that 
matter, any other revision of any other project?  And if 
there is such reason, what is it? 
  Our civilization has often confronted such 
questions in the past.  The answers did not come easy 
and only after a protracted period of struggle and 
resistance. Generally we have accepted 
change.  Justifications of change may have differed is 
specific formulations but most of them emphasized some 
lofty idealistic reason, such as the search for truth or a 
fulfillment of human destiny. One has to admit that both 
justifications are rather vague.  They originate in some 
metaphysical belief in human predestination. It tells us 
that we are different from nature. If change in nature is 
a result of some material causes, changes that humans 
pursue do not result from material causes but from 
some reasons that lie outside nature. 
Evolution is about reality and material causes 
and the version of the evolutionary theory presented in 
this essay observes this fundamental principle. This 
version is not a result of some idealistic inspiration. It is 
a product of the same factors that propel the 
evolutionary process, regardless of where it is taking 
place: the universe, nature, society, individual, or 
knowledge. The universal imperative of                 
conservation—everything must be conserved—requires 
the creation of new and increasingly more powerful 
levels of organization that advances the evolution.   
The revision of the Darwinian project presented 
in this essay does not abandon the Darwinian 
project. Rather, it seeks to affirm the validity of this 
project. As have already been indicated, it does not call 
for a destruction of the Darwinian model. On the 
contrary, it creates a broader frame that conserves it as 
its particular case, that is, a case that is valid under 
specific conditions or assumptions. 
We usually determine the validity of a theory on 
the basis of a putative criterion of truth that we often 
understand as one-to-one correspondence between our 
mental constructs and reality. The problem with this 
approach is that our mental constructs represent the 
most powerful level of organization of reality. Therefore, 
our mind is always capable of establishing one-to-one 
correspondences between its constructs and reality. So 
the real criterion for validating a theory or a model is 
one one-to-one correspondence; the real criterion is how 
powerful—that is, how inclusive—our mental constructs 
are.   
Does a model or a theory make a difference?  
Does it really matter which model or theory we use as 
long as empirical research proceeds apace?  It does.  A 
more comprehensive model offers more possibilities and 
therefore has greater explanatory power. It helps to 
identify more possibilities both in terms selection of facts 
and their interpretation.  Finally, and most importantly, it 
opens the path toward further advances that will 
conserve the current level of mental constructs and 
move the evolution of our mental organization forward.  
We cannot conserve our current mental constructs 
unless we continue to create new and more powerful 
levels of organization that will give rise to new mental 
constructs. 
If there is a lesson that we can derive from the 
Darwinian project, it is this:  As part of the evolutionary 
process, we should always aspire to create new and 
increasingly more powerful levels of organization that 
can sustain a richer and more inclusive vision of reality. 
This lesson also teaches us that evolution involves 
creation. Creation is a process that is open to human 
understanding.  In contrast to religion, we must not 
relegate this process to the sphere of the unknowable; 
on the contrary, we can and we must explain this 
process in rational terms, rather than accept the notion 
that it is inaccessible to our understanding.  If evolution 
teaches us anything, it is that our mind, our 
consciousness, our capacity to perform symbolic 
operations and use them in creating new and more 
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powerful levels of organization are its most powerful 
creations.  This realization is the most significant import 
of the Darwinian project—one that we should preserve 
and cherish. 
Endnotes 
1. One is reminded of an observation made, among 
others, by Jerry Fodor, a well-known cognitive 
scientist, that the survival of the fittest just means 
survival of those that survive, since the only criterion 
of fitness is that a creature does, indeed, survive 
and reproduce. 
2. Doyne Farmer, a mathematician, has coined the 
phrase “the edge of chaos” to describe the transition 
phenomenon discovered by computer scientist 
Christopher Langton.  Stuart Kauffman, a                     
well-known theoretical biologist, has popularized the 
term. 
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